Tuesday, December 2, 2025

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“If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God … and it shall be given him.” — James 1:5

PROFESSIONAL APPELLATE BRIEF REWRITE (Version #3)

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from a police encounter in which appellant Philip A. Kok was subjected to excessive force, improperly restrained, and later denied access to critical evidence necessary to support his claims. The trial court’s rulings—denying Pitchess discovery, striking appellant’s amended complaint, sustaining the City of Pasadena’s procedural objections while simultaneously deeming the case “at issue,” restricting relevant testimony, and excusing internal investigative failures—collectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.

The totality of the record demonstrates constitutional violations, statutory violations under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, and municipal liability under Monell principles. Appellant respectfully requests reversal.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED PITCHESS DISCOVERY

Appellant filed a Pitchess motion seeking personnel information relevant to excessive force. Before the hearing, he voluntarily narrowed the request and removed one officer entirely. Despite this, the court denied the motion as “overly broad.”

California Penal Code §832.7(c) expressly authorizes disclosure of non-identifying complaint data, and §832.7(e) requires agencies to notify complainants of complaint dispositions within 30 days. The Pasadena Police Department failed both duties.

The court also conflated the July and September filings, resulting in an improper denial that deprived appellant of evidence critical to evaluating officer credibility, use-of-force patterns, and internal affairs practices.

III. THE COURT’S TREATMENT OF APPELLANT’S AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS ARBITRARY AND PREJUDICIAL

After the court discouraged ex parte amendment, appellant filed an amended complaint immediately. Later, the court struck the amendment but left the summons intact. When appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and formal Leave to Amend, the court denied it without allowing additional service attempts.

While service objections remained, the court declared the case “at issue,” prejudicing appellant and foreclosing statutory opportunities to cure service defects.

IV. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY RESTRICTED PRETRIAL EVIDENCE

A. Denial of Evidence Related to Internal Affairs and Attorney Conduct

The court refused to consider evidence demonstrating the City Attorney’s prior concealment of personnel information and historic failures in internal discipline, directly relevant to a Monell theory of municipal ratification. Denial of this evidence impeded proof of municipal liability.

B. Lack of Cooperation in Witness Coordination

The City repeatedly failed to communicate about essential witnesses, including dispatch personnel, and the court provided no meaningful remedy. Witness obstruction compounded trial difficulties.

C. Motions in Limine Prevented Relevant Inquiry

The City’s motions in limine—excluding personnel and internal affairs information—were largely adopted without analysis, limiting appellant’s ability to prove excessive force or municipal liability.

V. TRIAL ERRORS: TESTIMONY, EVIDENTIARY DISCREPANCIES, AND RESTRICTED CROSS-EXAMINATION

A. Contradictory Testimony Undermined Officer Credibility
  • Use of Baton: Brown admitted once; Mosman said twice; Rosner did not recall; Bustamante denied seeing it.
  • Use of Leg Sweep: Brown admitted; Bustamante denied.
  • “Flailing” Arms: Mosman alleged; Dollar denied.
  • Emotional State: Some officers said appellant was “agitated”; others observed nothing unusual.

The trial court restricted appellant’s use of deposition testimony to impeach these contradictions. Restricted impeachment hindered credibility assessment.

B. Training Testimony Revealed Policy Instability and Lack of Oversight

Chief Melenkian claimed 40 hours of POST training; Sgt. Pratt testified handcuffing policy unchanged for decades. Policy updates were uncertain; Pratt could not confirm existence of formal policy. This supports failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise theories under Monell. Inadequate training and oversight contributed to excessive force.

C. Dispatch Tape Was “Blank,” Suggesting Mishandling
  • The tape was “absolutely blank.”
  • Cause unknown (malfunction or erasure).
  • No inspection of adjacent tape portions.
  • Cabinet lock never changed.
  • Veteran officer had never seen such a failure.

Possible evidence destruction or severe negligence.

D. Discriminatory Treatment Under the Unruh Act

Officers’ knowledge of appellant’s race, religion, or orientation was denied. Appellant argued modern bias is subtle, based on appearance, demeanor, or context. A hostile remark (“You’re never wrong, are you?”) and selective cultural sensitivity training were relevant. Subtle discrimination supports Unruh Act claim.

E. Misunderstanding of Legal Standards: Assault vs. Battery

Officer Brown and the Chief misused “assault” and “battery,” excusing their excessive force. Legal confusion allowed excessive force without accountability. The trial court restricted examination of these misunderstandings.

F. Allegation That Appellant Was “Fleeing” Does Not Justify Force

Bustamante interpreted movement toward the vehicle as “resisting”; Brown said fleeing minor collision is a misdemeanor. Under Tennessee v. Garner, disproportionate force is impermissible. Force was objectively unreasonable.

G. Officer Mindset Was Wrongfully Excluded

Brown admitted being “probably more upset than anything.” Courts, including Grooms and Bruner, recognize liability for failure to intervene. Exclusion of mindset evidence skewed reasonableness analysis.

VI. MEDICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIMS

Dr. Wogenson confirmed cervical disc disease and tightly pulled arms behind back. Differences in wording (“placed” vs. “pulled”) were immaterial. Medical evidence corroborated appellant’s account. Medical corroboration supports excessive force claims.

VII. THE CITY FAILED TO INVESTIGATE

Chief learned of baton use “in the last few weeks,” two years post-incident. Civilian review board testimony was deemed “irrelevant.” Persistent failure to investigate supports Monell liability and ratification of unconstitutional practices. Institutional failure exacerbated harm.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s cumulative errors—denying Pitchess discovery, restricting cross-examination, excusing inconsistent standards, failing to address erased dispatch recordings, striking amendments, and preventing municipal liability arguments—produced a fundamentally unfair trial. Contradictions in testimony, lack of oversight, failure to investigate, and medical corroboration compel reversal.

“And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” — John 8:32

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